Bioethics 10(1):1–26Ĭallahan S (1986) Abortion and the sexual agenda: a case for pro-life feminism. The MIT Press, Cambridgeīurgess J, Tawia S (1996) When did you first begin to feel it? Locating the beginning of human consciousness. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 10:68–75īraithwaite V (2010) Do fish feel pain? Oxford University Press, Oxfordīrody B (1975) Abortion and the sanctity of human life: a philosophical view. Cambridge University Press, New Yorkīortolotti L, Harris J (2005) Stem cell research, personhood and sentience. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 40–51īoonin D (2003) A defense of abortion. In: O’Neill O, Ruddick W (eds) Having children: philosophical and legal reflections on parenthood. Harmony (July 1993): 17-19īolton M (1979) Responsible women and abortion decisions.
Communication Quarterly 51(3):312–331īlackwood J (1993) The prolife movement, animals and the environment. International Philosophical Quarterly 32(1):105–118īlack J (2003) Extending the rights of personhood, voice, and life to sensate others: a homology of right to life and animal rights rhetoric.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridgeīeckwith F (1992) Personal bodily rights, abortion, and unplugging the violinist. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 198–227īeckwith F (2007) Defending life: a moral and legal case against abortion choice. In: Beachamp T, Frey R (eds) The oxford handbook of animal ethics. The New England Journal of Medicine 317(21):1321–1329īeauchamp T (2011) Rights theory and animal rights. Behavioral and Brain Science 30(1):82–83Īnand K, Hickey P (1987) Pain and its effects in the human neonate and fetus. Oxford University Press, New YorkĪnand K (2007) Consciousness, cortical function, and pain perception in non-verbal humans. Between the Species 7:181–89Īllan F (1969) Essentials of human embryology. Under what conditions we can blame an agent for her ignorance is the subject of discussion in Rosen ( 2003), Zimmerman ( 1997), Harman ( 2011), Smith ( 1983), and Guerrero ( 2007).Īdams C (1991) Abortion rights and animal rights. Thus, I will not attempt to distinguish between cases where a woman is responsible for her ignorance and when she is not culpable for her ignorance, but I will assume that not every instance of ignorance constitutes an excuse and that there are cases where a woman should have known that she was pregnant and thus is responsible for the relationship that develops with the fetus after eight weeks.
Since the goal of this article is to illustrate that the animal rights position has greater implications for abortion than Francione admits, it is not necessary that I address every pregnancy scenario. Answering this question requires an inquiry into the specific details surrounding the agent’s ignorance and an in-depth discussion about culpable ignorance which, due to space constraints, this article cannot sufficiently address. One might question whether a woman commits a moral wrong by aborting an unwanted fetus in a circumstance where she does not become aware that she is pregnant until after eight weeks gestation. Rather, erring on the side of caution, in this discussion, requires a woman who is pregnant with an unwanted fetus to exercise a significantly high standard of responsibility and to seek an early abortion. Thus, in this discussion, erring on the side of caution does not require the woman to forfeit her genuine right. In addition, I will later argue that, in the abortion discussion, the conflict of rights between the fetus and the woman does not emerge until the eighth week gestation, providing a woman with an eight week window to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, thereby allowing her to avoid a possible scenario where she might be forced to balance her genuine rights against the possible rights of a fetus. Yet, like Moller ( 2011), I argue that the moral risk should be taken seriously and furthermore should make some difference in our moral decision making. However, if we are to err on the side of caution in the case of an eight week year old fetus, this becomes problematic because, in cases of unwanted pregnancy, the possible rights of the fetus would be in direct conflict with a woman’s genuine rights. So, in the case of crustaceans, it is unproblematic to err on the side of caution in order to grant them rights since the possible rights of these beings are not in direct conflict with the genuine rights of a person. Erring on the side of caution might pose a problem when resources are scarce or in cases of a conflict between rights where erring on the side of caution might entail that a genuine right is overridden for the sake of a possible right.
0 kommentar(er)
